






University of Konstanz 
Department of Economics 
 
Working Effort and Endogenous 









                           Working Paper Series  





This paper considers job separations in a search model with labour mar-
ket matching and moral hazard. Both workers and ﬁrms value productive
matches and take actions to increase match stability: ﬁrms oﬀer a share
of match surplus to provide workers with correct incentives and workers
take hidden actions (eﬀort) negatively aﬀecting the match separation rate.
Heterogeneous productivity draws combined with the moral hazard prob-
lem give rise to match-speciﬁc endogenous separation rates. Additionally a
counteraction of two eﬀects – match stability and match scarcity – explains
an observed asymmetric shape of a wage probability density function with
a unique interior mode on the support.
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1”The next stage appears to be an integration of the market frictions that
characterize the DMP (Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides) model, with eﬃciency
wage models, which can explain wage setting within ﬁrms ...”
Olivier J. Blanchard (2008)
1 Introduction
The objective of this study is to analyze the behavior of a model economy with
search frictions, moral hazard and endogenous job separation rates. In order to
achieve this goal the paper develops a model, where ﬁrms face exogenous out-
put shocks, while workers can take hidden actions (eﬀort) to increase stability of
the output stream. Unobserved worker actions give rise to the traditional moral
hazard problem, so that ﬁrms respond by paying eﬃciency wages. In addition,
worker’s control over the output stability produces endogenous job separation
rates in the model. Endogenous control over the job stability is particularly rele-
vant in a model with search frictions since job search is a time-consuming process
and so the separations are costly to workers and ﬁrms. The eﬃciency wage de-
termination mechanism is strongly supported by the empirical evidence. Table
1 presents statistical summary of a large European data set collected by the re-
searchers of a Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). This data set covers more than
17000 of ﬁrms across 15 European economies, the results show that about 50%
of ﬁrms prefer to dismiss workers rather than to reduce base wages in response
to an output shock. At the same time one of the two major reasons for avoiding
the wage reduction is to maintain high eﬀort and working morale.
This evidence supports a link between worker’s eﬀort and wages which is origi-
nally suggested in the study by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The starting point of
this paper is to introduce this link in a dynamic search and matching framework
developed in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). In a dy-
namic setting agents are forward looking and derive value from a match surplus
rather than a match income ﬂow. The diﬀerence from a static setting is that the
match surplus is a function of both the net ﬂow productivity of the match and
the match separation rate such that a lower separation rate gives rise to a higher
match surplus. This paper proposes a model allowing workers to take hidden
actions (eﬀort) that have a negative impact on the match separation rate and
therefore extend the expected job duration.
2Response to demand shocks Approval Reasons for avoiding Approval
Possible strategy rate % base wage reductions rate %
Reduce non-labor costs 38.3 Lower work morale/less eﬀort 86
Reduce wages 12.6 Most productive workers leave 86
Base wages 1.9 Regulations/collective bargaining 73
Flexible wage components 10.7 Diﬃcult to attract new workers 72
Reduce amount of labour 49.4 Labor turnover costs increase 70
Permanent employees 15.7 External wages matter 68
Temporary employees 25.0 Reputation suﬀers 60
Hours worked per employee 8.7 Implicit contract 59
Source: Fabiani S., Galuscak K., Kwapil C., Lamo A., Room T. ”Wage Rigidities and
Labour Market Adjustment in Europe” (2010). Statistical data: WDN Survey
Table 1: Firms’ adjustment strategies to demand shocks
Model predictions can be described in the following way. First, the model in-
corporates the empirical evidence on eﬃciency wages and its implications for job
stability into the search and matching labour market framework. Here ﬁrms leave
positive rents to workers in order to motivate them to exert a desired level of ef-
fort and proﬁt from an improved match stability and a higher match surplus.
Workers bear the cost of eﬀort but face a lower match separation risk. This case
can be considered as a corner solution of a bargaining problem where ﬁrms have a
full bargaining power and job oﬀers are made on the basis of ”take-it-or-leave-it”.
The model is further generalized to characterize an equilibrium with an interior
value of the bargaining power. The paper shows that wages in this case can be
decomposed into the the bargaining premium and the motivation premium, which
would prevail in the absence of bargaining.
Second, the model is extended to the case of heterogeneous jobs. The jobs’
heterogeneity is achieved ex-post on the basis of an exogenous productivity dis-
tribution. The paper shows that ﬁrms in more productive matches oﬀer higher
wages to workers, motivate them to exert more eﬀort and indirectly obtain lower
separation rates compared to the ﬁrms with lower productivity. This mechanism
creates a situation where productivity is positively correlated with wages and
negatively with separations from a cross-sectional perspective. Strong empirical
evidence of a negative relationship between wages and separation rates can be
found in Leonard (1987), Anderson and Meyer (1994), Galizzi and Lang (1998)
and Christensen et al. (2005). Capelli and Chauvin (1991) explicitly consider the
eﬀect of wages on job dismissals, their results suggest that greater wage premiums
are associated with lower levels of shirking and dismissals.
3Furthermore, this paper presents an analysis of the interaction between the job’s
scarcity and its stability. In particular, it shows that the inverse relationship
between the job’s productivity and its separation rate is likely to produce hump-
shaped equilibrium wage and productivity distributions even if the initial produc-
tivity density is downward-sloping, meaning that the more productive jobs are
scarce in the economy. This oﬀers a new explanation of an observed phenomenon
of hump-shaped earnings distributions reported in Neal and Rosen (2000), Bon-
temps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and
Mortensen (2003).
This paper also considers the level of unemployment in search equilibrium with
eﬃciency wages and shows that lower wages do not reduce the equilibrium un-
employment rate. This result diﬀers from the classical eﬃciency wage theory
following the study by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Lower wages in search equi-
librium with moral hazard have two consequences: (a) ﬁrms obtain lower surplus,
so the job creation is less intensive, and (b) lower eﬀort is increasing the job sepa-
ration rate, so the spells of employment are shorter. In the case of heterogeneous
jobs the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the average separation rate
and the equilibrium job-ﬁnding rate. The eﬀect of a higher reservation produc-
tivity on unemployment is traditionally positive, but its explanation is new. Here
the positive eﬀect of a lower job-ﬁnding rate is partially neutralized by a negative
eﬀect of a higher average separation rate resulting from the fact that remaining
jobs are better paid and are therefore more stable (survivorship bias).
Finally, this study investigates the question of the optimal unemployment in-
surance (UI) in an economy with risk averse agents and moral hazard. In the
absence of moral hazard Baily (1978) and later Holmlund (1998) show that full
unemployment insurance is optimal in an economy with risk averse agents. This
result does not however extend to the economy with endogenous search eﬀort
among the unemployed, see Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001). In this paper a diﬀerent aspect of the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on
the decisions of labour market participants is analyzed. It is the unobservable
working eﬀort of the employed that is creating a trade-oﬀ for the social planner
between providing the full unemployment insurance versus the maximum eﬀort
incentives. As a result the partial unemployment insurance is optimal: it re-
duces expenses of the social planner for vacancies and UI beneﬁts due to the fact
4that workers exert positive eﬀort and jobs become more stable. In addition, this
study shows that the optimal replacement ratio is increasing in the risk aversion
of workers and is decreasing in the elasticity of the separation rate with respect
to the net ﬂow proﬁt.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the related
literature and section 3 presents notation and the model setup. The optimal in-
centive contracts and the labour market equilibrium are presented in section 4.
Section 5 presents an extension of the baseline model to account for jobs hetero-
geneity. Section 6 contains analysis of the equilibrium eﬃciency and the optimal
unemployment insurance. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Overview of the related literature
There are several major directions relating this paper to the existing literature on
labour turnover. First, this paper incorporates ideas of a shirking speciﬁcation of
the eﬃciency wage theory originally developed in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and
explored in more details in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Lazear (1998). This
theory hinges upon the assumption of the inability of employers to costlessly
observe worker’s eﬀort. The shirking speciﬁcation of the eﬃciency wage theory
assumes a discrete choice by the worker between shirking and non-shirking strate-
gies under the constraint that a dismissal necessarily follows if a worker is caught
shirking. However, dismissals only serve as a discipline device and do not occur in
the equilibrium, this is principally diﬀerent in the present study where negative
productivity shocks render the worker unemployed.
Another branch of this literature, namely the turnover speciﬁcation of the ef-
ﬁciency wage theory developed in Salop (1979), assumes that the labour turnover
is costly to the ﬁrm; therefore the ﬁrm may attempt to reduce separations by
oﬀering a higher wage to the worker. In the current research this idea is com-
bined with search frictions and endogenous separation probabilities. MacLeod
and Malcomson (1998) merge eﬃciency wages with a forward looking behavior
of agents. Similarly to the current study, they use the idea of job surplus rather
than a ﬂow wage to motivate workers to perform and exert eﬀort. The diﬀerence
occurs in the treatment of separation decisions which in their study are modeled
exogenously and are unrelated to worker performance.
5A combination of search frictions and agency problems has been originally in-
troduced in Moen and Rosen (2006, 2008). These authors explicitly consider the
question of eﬃciency wages in search equilibrium and develop the setup, where
both eﬀort and the match-speciﬁc productivity (type) are private information of
the worker, so that the model is characterized by a combination of moral haz-
ard and adverse selection problems. Moen and Rosen (2006) show that more
high-powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium
unemployment rates. Moen and Rosen (2009) combine incentive contracts and en-
dogenous worker turnover. Their paper deals with a deferred eﬀort compensation
and on-the-job search. Allowing workers to search on-the-job creates situations,
when workers quit before obtaining their performance related remuneration.
The theory of heterogeneous voluntary separations (quits) arising from search on-
the-job was developed in Burdett (1978), Jovanovich (1979), Jovanovich (1984)
and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and is summarized in Mortensen (2003) and
Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005). The general idea of these studies is that
the probability of an outside oﬀer to exceed the worker’s current wage (quit prob-
ability) is decreasing in the current wage. These models play a major role in the
explanation of the hump-shaped wage and productivity density functions based
on wage competition between ﬁrms and on-the-job search. The current study
is complementary to this group of papers and describes an additional source of
job heterogeneity resulting from internal principal-agent problems within a match
and relevant for the explanation of unimodal wage and productivity distributions.
Another approach to job destruction in a search and matching general equi-
librium framework was introduced in the studies by Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and Pissarides (2000). According to this approach independent idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks give rise to an endogenous job destruction rate. Once
the productivity falls below the reservation productivity, the ﬁrm and the worker
simultaneously decide to separate. This links the reservation productivity and
the job separation rate, hence making the latter endogenous. Further extensions
of this approach such as Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) allow the job
destruction rate to be heterogeneous across ﬁrms. It is the explanation of this
result and not the result itself that is diﬀerent in the current study. Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) explain job destruction on the basis of job speciﬁc product
6demand ﬂuctuations while this study attempts to extend their approach with an
individual worker performance component.
3 Labour market modeling framework
The model is ﬁrst analyzed in a homogeneous agent framework where the focus is
on individual decision making of workers and ﬁrms in the presence of asymmetric
information. Further in section 5 the model is generalized to account for the
ex-post heterogeneity of job matches. This allows to study the properties of a
general equilibrium in a labour market characterized by search frictions and ﬁrm
speciﬁc endogenous separation rates.
In section 4 the labour market consists of a continuum of identical workers and
ﬁrms. Each worker can be found in one of two possible states: employed and ex-
erting nonnegative eﬀort or unemployed and searching for a job. Similarly each
ﬁrm has a job position which can be either ﬁlled with a worker or vacant and
searching for a worker. Firms and workers share a common constant discount fac-
tor r. In section 5 job matches are heterogeneous with respect to the productivity
parameter p drawn from the productivity distribution F(p). Job search is ran-
dom and undirected and the productivity realization is simultaneously revealed
to the worker and ﬁrm once a match has been formed. Workers reject job oﬀers
below the reservation wage while ﬁrms reject productivity realizations below the
reservation productivity.
When employed the worker chooses an optimal eﬀort level e ≥ 0 in response
to the contract wage w. Eﬀort is measured on a continuous scale and is not ob-
servable to the ﬁrm. In addition, workers are risk averse and have instantaneous
utility functions of the form: υ(w) − C(e), where υ(w) is an increasing concave
function of ﬂow wage and C(e) is an increasing and convex function of eﬀort.
Both functions are normalized to yield a zero instantaneous utility to the worker
with zero wage and eﬀort values: υ(0) = 0,C(0) = 0. In addition, it is assumed
that C′(0) = 0. Firms are risk-neutral.
7Every employment relationship is exposed to a permanent productivity shock
reducing the productivity value to zero1. The productivity shock arrives with a
Poisson arrival rate s(e), which is the separation rate of a match. One of the
most important features of the model is that the separation rate is modeled as
a decreasing function of worker’s eﬀort, meaning that higher eﬀort decreases the
probability of a negative productivity shock, i.e. s′(e) < 0. Here e = 0 implies
that the separation rate is equal to it’s maximum value s(0) = ¯ s. Once the zero
productivity value was drawn the job is destroyed and the worker becomes un-
employed. One direct implication of this process is that a present value of output
is an increasing function of worker’s eﬀort:
R ∞
0 p exp(−s(e))dt. This expression
is a dynamic equivalent of a static concept of a positive relationship between
expected output and workers’s eﬀort widely used in the moral hazard literature.
The concept of match separation is closely related to that of the job duration.
Under the Poisson speciﬁcation of separation events the expected job duration is
inversely related to the separation rate of a match, i.e. d(e) = 1/s(e). This oﬀers
an alternative explanation of the eﬀect of hidden actions taken by workers: higher
eﬀort decreases the separation rate and has a positive eﬀect on the expected job
duration.
Matching between ﬁrms and unemployed workers is modeled using the match-
ing function approach. Let u denote the unemployment rate and v - the vacancy
rate (expressed as a ratio of vacant jobs to the size of the labour force). Then the
number of job matches taking place per unit time and expressed as a fraction of
the labour force is given by:
m = m(u,v)
The matching function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, concave,
and homogeneous of degree 1. The homogeneity assumption is required in order
to abstract from the size eﬀects of the labour market and describe the major
labour market variables in relative terms. Let θ be the labour market tightness
parameter: θ ≡ v
u - the number of vacancies per unemployed worker. This allows
to derive the job arrival rate λ(θ) and the vacancy ﬁlling rate q(θ) as functions
1Throughout the paper it is assumed that the productivity value falls to zero upon a negative
productivity shock, however it is suﬃcient to assume that the new productivity realization is
below the worker’s reservation wage.








Wages are determined via the concept of generalized Nash bargaining where both
workers and ﬁrms account for the expected eﬀort response. There is no commit-
ment, so that wages are continuously renegotiated. In the equilibrium worker
rents can be decomposed into the motivation premium and the bargaining pre-
mium, where the ﬁrst one implies leaving job rents to the worker in order to
provide him with the correct working incentives. This reﬂects an essence of the
eﬃciency wage component of the model. Once employed the worker faces a trade-
oﬀ: exerting more eﬀort at cost C(e) and decreasing the separation risk versus
exerting less eﬀort and bearing a high separation risk. Optimal eﬀort level is
obtained by equating marginal gains and marginal costs of eﬀort in the course of
the worker’s surplus maximization strategy.
Employing an eﬃciency wage determination mechanism in addition to bargaining
requires clariﬁcation of such an argument as a bonding critique. The idea of the
bonding critique is that workers pay a bond or an up-front hiring fee to the ﬁrm
upon taking a job which may serve as a mechanism to prevent shirking. There-
fore bonds or ﬁring fees are often viewed as a substitute for eﬃciency wages in
the part of providing correct incentives to the workers. There are several reasons
why bonding is assumed to be prohibited in the model and ﬁrms are not allowed
to charge an up-front fee.
As noticed in Moen and Rosen (2006) an entrance fee would have to be paid
before a worker and a ﬁrm learn their match-speciﬁc productivity. Once bond
value is an interior point in the support of the distribution of job values, a ﬁrm
may adopt a strategy of leaving the most productive workers and ﬁring the least
productive workers in order to collect their bonds. This highlights an emerging
moral hazard problem on the side of a ﬁrm. Therefore, allowing ﬁrms to charge
an up-front fee would require extending the model to provide ﬁrms with correct
incentives which is not a subject of current research. Carmichael (1990) presents
a list of potential solutions how to eliminate this moral hazard problem. The most
sensible of them is to collect entrance fees into a pension fund and redistribute
9to the other workers if shirking occurs. Moreover, Ritter and Taylor (1994) show
that bonds can be treated by workers as signals of high chances of bankruptcy.
And so the safest ﬁrms will have incentives not to charge entrance fees in order
to signal a high survival probability.
4 Moral hazard in search equilibrium
4.1 Workers: optimal eﬀort choice
Let U and W denote the present-discounted value of the expected income stream
of respectively, an unemployed and an employed worker. When a worker accepts
a job at wage w, he chooses an optimal eﬀort level e and keeps the job until a
negative productivity shock arrives and the job is destroyed. If a worker rejects
the job, he receives unemployment income z and searches again next period.
Bellman equations for the unemployed and employed workers are:
rU = υ(z) + λ(θ)(W − U) (4.1)
rW = max
e≥0
{υ(w) − C(e) − s(e)(W − U)}, (4.2)
where s(e) is a job separation rate. An employed worker maximizes the job
surplus (W −U) given a wage oﬀer w and a value of unemployment U. The choice
variable of worker’s maximization problem is eﬀort e chosen in the positive domain
[0,∞] in order to balance the marginal gain of a lower separation rate s(e) and
the marginal cost C(e). The ﬁrst order condition for the worker’s optimization
problem takes the following form:
W − U =









Equation (4.3) is an incentive compatibility constraint for a worker and describes
the functional relationship between the optimal eﬀort level e and the earned wage
w. Optimal eﬀort is also a function of the reservation wage of the worker denoted
w0. Worker’s participation constraint implies W ≥ U, so that the reservation
wage w0 can be obtained from equation W(w0) = U, this means w0 = υ−1(rU).
This is true since e(w0,w0) = 0, meaning that workers choose zero eﬀort in re-
sponse to the reservation wage w0. Analysis of the properties of the optimal eﬀort
function e(w,w0) gives rise to the following lemma.
10Lemma 1: (suﬃcient condition) Consider a risk averse worker with an increas-
ing and convex eﬀort cost function C(e), such that C(0) = 0 and C′(0) = 0. Then
eﬀort e(w,w0) is an increasing function of the net ﬂow utility ∆υ ≡ υ(w)−υ(w0)
if s′′(e) ≥ 0. It is also true that e(w0,w0) = 0.
Proof: Appendix I.
Let the inequality s′′(e) ≥ 0 in the following be denoted as assumption (A1).
Lemma 1 implies that under assumption (A1) eﬀort e(w,w0) is an increasing
function of wage w for a given reservation wage w0 and a decreasing function
of w0 for a given wage w. This result is in accordance with the eﬃciency wage
theory which deﬁnes eﬃciency wages as ”high wages paid to workers to induce
them to put forth more eﬀort” (Lazear (1998, 70)). There is a straightforward
economic explanation of this result. A higher value of wage oﬀer w raises the
present discounted value of worker’s total surplus W −U and therefore increases
the marginal beneﬁt of holding this position. A higher marginal beneﬁt of the job
allows the worker to increase his eﬀort level in order to equalize the marginal cost
and the marginal beneﬁt. Put diﬀerently, a higher job surplus implies a higher
value loss for the worker in case of the negative productivity shock. In this case
the worker is responding by raising eﬀort and reducing the probability of a sepa-
ration. Condition (A1) also guarantees validity of the ﬁrst order approach.
Further analysis of wage determination requires a statement about the curva-
ture of the optimal eﬀort function. For this deﬁne µs – absolute value of the











Then suﬃcient conditions for the concavity of the eﬀort function are summarized
in lemma 2.
Lemma 2: (suﬃcient conditions) Consider a risk-averse worker with an eﬀort
function e(w,w0) given in lemma 1 and an eﬀort cost function C(e) such that
C′′′(e) ≥ 0 for e ≥ 0. Then the eﬀort function e(w,w0) is concave in the net ﬂow





∂e2 ≥ 0 where ˜ µs = 1/µs (A2)
11Proof: Appendix II.
Variable ˜ µs is auxiliary, it is an inverse of the semi-elasticity variable µs. As-
sumptions (A2) require the semi-elasticity variable µs to be a decreasing function
of eﬀort. The semi-elasticity variable µs reﬂects the degree to which worker’s
actions may inﬂuence the separation rate, therefore a lower value of this variable
corresponds to the situation of a lower responsiveness of the separation rate to
workers’ actions and forces workers to exert more eﬀort in order to obtain the
desired optimal level of job stability. This implies a positive relationship between
eﬀort e and wages w.
Example: linear job duration.
Consider the case, when job duration is a linear function of worker’s eﬀort:
d(e) = e + δ, where parameter δ denotes the minimum expected job duration
corresponding to the case of zero eﬀort (d(0) = δ). This functional assumption
gives rise to the inverse relationship between a separation rate and worker’s eﬀort
taking the following form s(e) = 1/d(e) = 1/(e + δ). Here the highest separa-
tion rate ¯ s corresponds to the case of the lowest expected job duration so that
¯ s = 1/d(0) = 1/δ. Note that s′′(e) = 2/(e+δ)3 > 0 so that eﬀort is an increasing
function of wage. The inverse of the semi-elasticity variable µs is found as:
˜ µs = (r(e + δ) + 1)(e + δ) (4.5)
Investigation of the properties of variable µs allows to make a reference about the
curvature of the optimal eﬀort function. As follows from expressions
∂˜ µs
∂e
= 2r(e + δ) + 1 > 0
∂2˜ µs
∂e2 = 2r > 0
and lemmas 1-2, the optimal eﬀort function is increasing and concave in wage. ♦
For the subsequent analysis it is convenient to use the concept of worker rents
R associated with the employment, where R ≡ W − U. Applying the envelope
theorem to equation (4.3) allows to conclude that the expected worker rent R is
an increasing function of the net ﬂow utility ∆υ and an increasing function of
12wage w for a given reservation wage w0. There are generally three eﬀects of w on
the worker’s rent. First, there is a direct positive eﬀect on the ﬂow utility υ(w).
Second, there is a positive eﬀect of w on eﬀort. The implications of this second
eﬀect for the worker’s rent are twofold: higher eﬀort costs C(e) are combined
with a lower job separation rate s(e). However, as eﬀort is optimally chosen by
workers these last two eﬀects are mutually neutralized.
4.2 Firms: wage determination
Let J be the present discounted value of expected proﬁt from an occupied job and
V the present-discounted value of expected proﬁt from a vacant job. In order to
maintain an open position ﬁrms incur a vacancy ﬂow cost denoted by c. Consider
Bellman equations for an open vacancy and a ﬁlled job position:
rV = −c + q(θ)(J − V ) (4.6)
rJ = p − w − s(e)(J − V ), (4.7)
where e = e(w,w0) - optimal worker eﬀort function. Equation (4.7) describes a
trade-oﬀ faced by a ﬁrm. For ﬁxed values of p and w0 a ﬁrm bargaining lower
wage would enjoy a higher ﬂow proﬁt p −w but should also expect a higher sep-
aration rate s(w,w0) = s(e(w,w0)). In contrast a ﬁrm bargaining higher wage
would bear a lower ﬂow proﬁt p − w but should also expect a lower separation
rate s(w,w0). Lower separation rate in this case implies improvement in the job
stability and a longer expected job duration.
The contract wage w is determined via the concept of generalized Nash bar-
gaining where both bargaining parties account for the optimal eﬀort response of
the worker. Outside option of a negotiating worker is to remain unemployed and
search for another job, so that the rent of such a worker is given by R = W −U.
The rent of a ﬁrm negotiating with an unemployed worker is given by J − V . In
addition, the free-entry condition for opening new vacancies implies that compe-
tition between ﬁrms drives rents from a marginal vacant job to zero: V = 0, so
that wage w is determined in the following way:
max
w
hυ(w) − υ(w0) − C(e)
r + s(e)
iβh p − w
r + s(e)
i1−β
where e = e(w,w0) (4.8)
13Here β denotes the worker’s bargaining power and the reservation wage w0 is
treated parametrically. For the interior solution of e > 0 the optimal wage equa-
tion is given in proposition 1:
Proposition 1: Suppose ﬁrms and workers treat the reservation wage w0 para-
metrically, then solution to the optimization problem (4.8) is as follows:
(a) For 0 < β < 1 the optimal wage equation is:







where ηs ≡ ∂ ln(r + s(e))/∂ ln(p − w) – elasticity of the extended discount
rate r + s(e) with respect to the net ﬂow proﬁt p − w.
(b) For the case β = 0 the optimal wage equation implies ηs = 1.






















There are a number of implications following from proposition 1. First consider
the interior case 0 < β < 1, notice that when workers are risk averse variable
υ′
w can be interpreted as a ”shadow price” of an output unit for the worker. It
measures the change in the worker utility value given a unit transfer of output
from the ﬁrm to the worker. Therefore, equation (4.9) contains worker surplus
value expressed in terms of the ﬁrm surplus: R/υ′
w.
Second, variable ηs is an elasticity of the extended discount rate r + s(e) with
respect to the net ﬂow proﬁts p − w. Higher net proﬁts p − w imply a lower
wage w, this means that workers exert less eﬀort and the separation rate of such
a match is higher. In the equilibrium with 0 < β < 1 it should be true that
ηs < 1. This means that optimal wages are set above the level maximizing the
ﬁrm surplus J which is obtained for ηs = 1. The situation is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
Point A in ﬁgure 1 corresponds to the case of a monopsonistic labour market with
14β = 0 where ﬁrms maximize job surplus J with respect to wage given the optimal
eﬀort response by workers. The optimal wage in this case is denoted by w(p,w0).
The bargaining power of a worker in a monopsonistic labour market is zero and
therefore the wage takes form of a motivation premium providing incentives for












Figure 1: Optimal wage in search equilibrium with moral hazard
Point B in ﬁgure 1 corresponds to the more general case 0 < β < 1 where
wages are set according to (4.9) and ηs < 1. The optimal wage function in this
case is w∗(p,w0). In the equilibrium ﬁrms pay the bargaining and the motivation
premia, and therefore obtain a lower surplus value J compared to the situation
with only one motivation premium in a monopsonistic labour market with search
frictions. Properties of the search equilibrium with moral hazard and wage bar-
gaining are summarized in proposition 2:
Proposition 2: Let assumptions (A1) - (A2) be satisﬁed. Then search equi-
librium with moral hazard and wage bargaining (0 < β < 1) is characterized by a
tuple of variables {e,w,w0,θ} satisfying the worker incentive compatibility con-
straint (4.3), the optimal wage equation (4.9), the free entry condition V = 0,
deﬁning variable θ, and the following reservation wage equation
υ(w0) = υ(z) + λ(θ)R (4.10)
The necessary condition for the equilibrium existence is p ≥ w0.
15The equilibrium unemployment rate is obtained from the diﬀerential equation




, where e = e(w,w0) (4.11)
Consider the border case β = 0 corresponding to the equilibrium with eﬃciency
wages. Classical theory on eﬃciency wages (see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) pre-
dicts that involuntary unemployment may appear in economies with unobservable
eﬀort, inducing ﬁrms to pay higher wages. High wages paid by ﬁrms in order to
motivate their employees reduce the demand for labour and can explain the equi-
librium unemployment. However, introduced in a model with search frictions,
eﬃciency wages do not increase the number of unemployed. In contrast, paying a
lower wage in the economy with search frictions and unobservable eﬀort has two
consequences: ﬁrst, ﬁrms’ proﬁts fall due to a reduced output stability, so that
job creation is less intensive, second, the separation rate of every match in the
economy is higher. As a result, the lower job-ﬁnding rate λ(θ) and the higher job
separation rate s(e) add up to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate.
4.3 Comparative statics
This section considers the implications of an exogenous shift in the productivity
parameter p for the optimal wage w. Results obtained in this section are con-
sistent with the empirical ﬁndings listed below and will also prove useful for the
case of heterogeneous jobs investigated in section 5. Consider the case β = 0,
then equation ηs = 1 can be alternatively rewritten as
p = w + ˜ µs/e
′
w (4.12)
This means that if assumptions (A1)-(A2) are satisﬁed the right-hand side of this
equation is an increasing function of w so that equation ηs = 1 indirectly implies
a positive relationship between the wage and the productivity: ∂w(p,w0)/∂p > 0.
This means that a surplus maximizing ﬁrm with a higher productivity p would
oﬀer a higher wage w to the worker and enjoy an improved output stability. In
this setting the moral hazard problem forces ﬁrms to leave rents to their workers
in order to induce worker’s eﬀort.
16The situation is similar for the case 0 < β < 1. It can be shown that the
right hand side of equation (4.9) is an increasing function of wage, since both
functions R/υ′(w) and ηs = µse′(e)(p − w) are increasing in w if assumptions
(A1)-(A2) are satisﬁed. The situation is depicted in ﬁgure (2). The left hand
side of equation (4.9) is ﬁrm’s surplus and is a decreasing function of wage in the
range w∗(p,w0) > w(p,w0). Now consider an exogenous shift in the productivity
parameter from p to p′ for a given value of the reservation wage w0. The ﬁrm
surplus curve shifts outwards in the relevant range w∗(p,w0) > w(p,w0), while
the curve R(w)(1 − ηs)/υ′(w) shifts downwards, since variable ηs is increasing
in p. Therefore it can be concluded, that wage is an increasing function of the
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Figure 2: Optimal wage as a function of productivity
This result is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings. For example, Hildreth and
Oswald (1997, 326) report that ”the movements in the degree of ﬁrms’ ﬁnan-
cial prosperity are eventually transmitted ... into movements in the pay levels
of workers”, which means that changes in proﬁtability cause long-run changes in
wages. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) estimated the elasticity of wages with respect
to the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability to be approximately 0.02. At the same time Blanch-
ﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) estimated the elasticity in the range between
0.02 to 0.05, which means that doubling proﬁtability of a ﬁrm will result in up
to a 5% increase in wages over several years.
17Equation (4.12) also implies that the optimal wage w(p,w0) is an increasing








This means that a higher reservation wage w0 forces ﬁrms to pay higher wages.
Note further that if more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages to workers, meaning
that workers’ losses in case of a separation are higher, then (ex-ante identical)
workers employed in more productive ﬁrms would exert more eﬀort and produc-










5 Heterogeneous productivity realizations
5.1 Stationary search equilibrium
Throughout this section every match of a worker and a ﬁrm is characterized by a
match-speciﬁc productivity draw p from an exogenous productivity distribution
F(p) with the support in the range [0, ¯ p]. This uncertainty about productivity is
meant to reﬂect diversity of workers and jobs without modeling such heterogeneity
explicitly. The productivity realization is simultaneously revealed to the worker
and ﬁrm once the match has been formed. The matching process is random and
undirected. This approach creates an ex-post productivity heterogeneity of jobs
and is originally introduced in the study by Pissarides (2000). Also to simplify
the representation only the case β = 0 is considered throughout this section.
In a situation when the productivity is revealed upon a match both unemployed
workers and vacant jobs form expectations based on the productivity distribution
F(p). The Bellman equations for unemployed workers and vacant jobs adjusted
to account for the ex-post productivity heterogeneity can be written as:
rU = υ(z) + λ(θ)
Z
max(W(p) − U,0)dF(p) (5.1)
rV = −c + q(θ)
Z
max(J(p) − V,0)dF(p) (5.2)
18Let p0 denote the reservation productivity, i.e. the minimum productivity level
at which the ﬁrm will employ the worker. Consider a ﬁrm with a productivity
draw p0. Oﬀering the worker wage w(p0) > p0 will result in a negative prof-
its ﬂow of the ﬁrm, hence for the reservation productivity p0 it must hold that
w(p0) ≤ p0 meaning that the ﬁrm surplus is nonnegative. At the same time of-
fering the worker wage w(p0) < w0 will result in the oﬀer rejection, hence for the
reservation productivity p0 it must also hold that w(p0) ≥ w0 meaning that the
worker surplus is nonnegative. In general in the equilibrium it must hold that
p0 = w(p0) = w0 guaranteeing that at the reservation productivity participation
constraints are binding for both contracting parties. Here the ﬁrst part of the
equality comes from the formal deﬁnition of variable p0 meaning that the ﬁrm
surplus is zero at the reservation productivity: J(p0) = 0 or p0 = w(p0) from
equation (4.7). The second part of the equality comes from the fact that if a
ﬁrm is oﬀering a wage as high as the productivity draw means that wage w(p0) is
the lowest wage that unemployed workers would accept. This corresponds to the
deﬁnition of the reservation wage so that w(p0) = w0. Note also that at the wage
oﬀer w(p0) = w0 the worker would exert zero eﬀort e(0) = 0 and the separation
rate attains its maximum value of s(0) = ¯ s.
To derive conditions characterizing an equilibrium, consider ﬁrst surplus equa-
tions for a worker and a ﬁrm given that both parties follow their optimal surplus
maximizing strategies. Using the wage-setting equation (4.12) for the case β = 0









where e = e(w(p),w0) and e′
w = ∂e(w(p),w0)/∂w.
Representation (5.3) allows to make a reference about the major properties of
the ﬁrm’s surplus. First of all, under assumptions (A1)-(A2) ﬁrm’s surplus is an
increasing function of productivity draw p meaning that ﬁrms with higher pro-
ductivity draws attain higher match surplus values. This follows directly from the
envelope theorem. On the one hand, a higher productivity draw implies a higher
net ﬂow proﬁt p − w(p). On the other hand, high productivity ﬁrms pay higher
wages and their ﬂow proﬁts are more stable on average. Both eﬀects contribute
to the fact that ﬁrm surplus J(p,w0) is an increasing function of p. Additionally
19it can be shown that under the same set of assumptions ﬁrm’s surplus J(p,w0)
is an increasing function of the net ﬂow utility ∆υ and therefore a decreasing












Consider an equilibrium characterized by a set of surplus equations (4.2), (4.7),
(5.1), (5.2) and a free-entry condition V = 0. In the equilibrium it holds that







Equation (5.5) is a job creation (JC) condition and describes a decreasing relation-
ship between the market tightness parameter θ and the reservation productivity
p0, which means that a higher reservation productivity p0 leads to less job cre-
ation. Intuitive explanation of this equation is that the expected vacancy cost on
the left-hand side is equated to the expected job proﬁt on the right-hand side (if
both sides are divided by (1 − F(p0))). Moreover the left-hand side of equation
(5.5) is an increasing function of the market tightness parameter θ. This directly
follows from the properties of the matching function described in section 3 and
means that a higher value of θ makes it less probable to ﬁll a vacancy and raises
the expected vacancy cost. The right-hand side of equation (5.5) is a decreasing
function of the reservation productivity p0. This follows from the fact that a
higher reservation productivity p0 and hence a higher reservation wage w0, ﬁrst,
reduces the acceptance probability of the worker 1 − F(p0) and, second, forces
ﬁrms to pay higher wages. Both eﬀects translate into a lower ﬁrm surplus.




where e = e(w(p),w0). As proved in section 4 surplus R(p,w0) is a decreas-
ing function of the reservation wage w0. Then the equilibrium equation for the
20reservation productivity can be written as:




This equation describes an increasing relationship between the market tightness
parameter θ and the reservation productivity p0 (see ﬁgure 3). More vacancies
increase the job-ﬁnding rate λ(θ) and make unemployed workers more choosy:
their reservation wage w0 = p0 rises. Therefore a stationary equilibrium is fully
characterized by a tuple of variables (θ,p0,w,e) where equations (5.5)-(5.6) yield
unique equilibrium values of θ and p0 and equations (4.3) and (4.12) describe
the optimal values of contract wage w(p,p0) and worker’s eﬀort e(p,p0) for every
productivity draw p ∈ [p0, ¯ p]. The cross-sectional properties of this equilibrium







Figure 3: Equilibrium reservation productivity and market tightness
Proposition 3: In a dynamic general equilibrium model with ex-post job hetero-
geneity, moral hazard and β = 0 described by a set of surplus equations (4.2),
(4.7), (5.1), (5.2), a free-entry condition V = 0, and under a set of assumptions
(A1)-(A2) there is a positive cross-sectional correlation of wages, productivity and
job durations.
Proof: A positive cross-sectional correlation of wages and productivity values
is implied by equation (4.12). A positive correlation of wages and job durations
follows from the worker incentive compatibility constraint (4.3). ♦
21The mutual reservation policy of workers and ﬁrms implies that the stationary
productivity distribution is truncated at point p0 and productivity draws p < p0
are not observed in the equilibrium. This also has important implications for the
stationary earnings distribution and the unemployment rate in the steady-state
equilibrium analyzed in the following section.
5.2 Stationary earnings distribution
This section presents analysis of the equilibrium distributions of productivity and
earnings in search equilibrium with heterogeneous separation rates. Let G(p)
denote the stationary productivity distribution, where G(p0) = 0 and G(¯ p) = 1,
and let g(p) be the corresponding density function such that g(p) > 0 for p0 ≤
p ≤ ¯ p and g(p) = 0 for p < p0. Then the average job separation rate s(p0) in the




s(p,p0)dG(p), where s(p,p0) = s(e(p,p0)) (5.7)
and e(p,p0) = e(w(p,p0),p0) is decreasing in p0.
Consider a continuum of jobs with a productivity realization p or less and de-
note it with E(p). In the stationary equilibrium an inﬂow of workers into this
group should be equal to the outﬂow of workers from this group. The inﬂow of
workers consists of those unemployed individuals drawing the productivity value
in the range [p0;p], hence the inﬂow of workers is equal to uλ(θ)[F(p) − F(p0)].
The outﬂow of workers from this group consists of employed individuals who lose
their jobs at rates s(x,p0) : x ∈ [p0;p]. Therefore the number of jobs with a
productivity realization p or less (E(p)) obeys the following diﬀerential equation:
˙ E(p) = uλ(θ)[F(p)−F(p0)]−(1−u)
Z p
p0
s(x,p0)g(x)dx, p ∈ [p0; ¯ p] (5.8)
In a stationary equilibrium ˙ E(p) = 0, so that:
uλ(θ)[F(p) − F(p0)] = (1 − u)
Z p
p0
s(x,p0)g(x)dx, p ∈ [p0; ¯ p] (5.9)
22Setting p = ¯ p rewrite equation (5.9) as follows:
uλ(θ)[1 − F(p0)] = (1 − u)s(p0), (5.10)
which is equivalent to the diﬀerential equation ˙ u = 0, so that the stationary
unemployment rate u is given by:
u =
s(p0)
s(p0) + λ(θ)(1 − F(p0))
(5.11)









In order to obtain the stationary productivity density function g(p) diﬀerentiate










for p ∈ [p0; ¯ p].
There are generally two eﬀects driving the transformation of the productivity
draw distribution F(p) into the stationary productivity distribution G(p). See
ﬁgure 4. Both transformations strengthen the fact that the stationary distribu-
tion G(w) dominates the initial distribution F(w) (G(w) ≤ F(w)). First of all,
note that for a constant exogenous separation rate s = s(p,p0) = s(p0) the den-









The ﬁrst transformation of f(p) is explained by the reservation policy of work-
ers and implies that the productivity density function g(p) is truncated at p = p0.
The second transformation of f(p) can be explained by diﬀerences in job du-
rations 1/s(p,p0) of jobs with diﬀerent productivity values p. Note that the less








Figure 4: Equilibrium transformation of the productivity distribution
than the more productive jobs. So that jobs with productivity values p such that
s(p,p0) > s(p0) are destroyed faster than the average and jobs with productivity
values p such that s(p,p0) < s(p0) are destroyed more slowly than the job with
an average separation rate s(p0).
Now the only parameter to be deﬁned in equations for g(p) and G(p) is the
average separation rate in the stationary equilibrium s(p0). To obtain this pa-
rameter value recall that g(p) is a density function of the stationary productivity



















p0 f(p)/s(p,p0)dp and is used to simplify the notation.
Note that because H(p0) is a strictly decreasing function of p0 the eﬀect of the
reservation productivity p0 on s(p0) is ambiguous. The positive part of this eﬀect
is explained by the fact that a higher reservation productivity p0 = w0 raises
24the reference income point for the worker and increases thereafter the match
separation rate s(p,p0). This eﬀect translates into a lower stability of jobs and
a higher separation rate for every match. The negative part of the eﬀect cor-
responds to the fact that a higher p0 reduces the number of successful matches
in the economy and therefore has a negative eﬀect on the average separation rate.
The ﬁnal expression for the stationary unemployment rate can be obtained from
equation (6.2) by substituting the expression for the average separation rate:
u =
s(p0)




This equation is a version of the Beveridge curve describing a negative relation-
ship between unemployment and vacancies for a given value p0. The structure of
this equation shows that a higher reservation productivity p0 shifts the Beveridge
curve outwards due to a lower value of H(p0). However, an increase in the reserva-
tion productivity p0 is accompanied by a change of the market tightness θ (mutual
dynamics of the two variables is presented in ﬁgure 3). In general an eﬀect of
a higher p0 on the stationary unemployment rate is ambiguous. Nevertheless, if
an original shock to the economy, causing the higher reservation productivity p0,
was such that the market tightness parameter θ decreases (it becomes relatively
easier to ﬁnd a job), then the labour market is characterized by an additional
downward movement along the Beveridge curve which unambiguously increases
the stationary unemployment rate u in the economy. This sequence of events,
for example, takes place in case of a higher unemployment beneﬁt parameter z
resulting in a higher income of the unemployed, a higher reservation productivity
and a higher stationary unemployment rate in the economy.
Stationary productivity distribution is an important characteristic of the model,
however, one may be interested in ﬁnding an implied stationary wage (earnings)
distribution, ﬁrst of all for the reason that wage is an observed variable and the
model-implied theoretical distribution of wages may then be compared with its
empirical counterpart.
Let k(w) denote the probability density of an equilibrium wage distribution such
that k(w) > 0 for w ∈ [w0,w(¯ p)] and k(w) = 0 otherwise. Wages w are deﬁned
on the basis of a match-speciﬁc productivity draw p. This describes wage as a
25function of p: w(p), which is implicitly given in equation (4.12) for the case β = 0.
Using an expression for the probability density of a function of a random variable
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w)2 > 1 for w ∈ [w0,w(¯ p)]
Equation (5.15) shows, that the shape of the wage density function k(w) is de-
ﬁned by the properties of the wage function w(p) and the stationary productivity
density function g(p). As shown in section 5.2 the density g(p) of the stationary
productivity distribution is likely to have an interior mode on the support [p0, ¯ p].
In this case if wage is a concave function of productivity, so that (∂w/∂p)−1 is
an increasing function of wage, the wage density function k(w) is likely to have
a stronger right shift than the productivity density function g(p).
6 Eﬃciency and unemployment insurance
6.1 Constrained eﬃciency
This section considers eﬃciency properties as well as the optimal unemployment
insurance in a decentralized equilibrium with risk averse workers and on-the-job
moral hazard. Equilibrium unemployment is an inherent component of all search
models and therefore the maximum welfare is never obtained since unemployment
is a waste of labour resources. Nevertheless the welfare maximization problem of
the social planner can be stated in terms of restricted eﬃciency, meaning that the
social planner is subject to the same matching constraints as market participants.
The ﬁrst question raised in this section is whether the individual decisions of
market participants in a decentralized equilibrium, in particular the equilibrium
wage, eﬀort and the market tightness, maximize the social welfare. To simplify
the exposition only the case of identical productivity p across jobs is considered
throughout this section. The social planner is maximizing the present value of









uυ(z) + (1 − u)(υ(w) − C(e))
i
dt, where e = e(w,w0)
The choice of the social planner is restricted by the resource constraint, meaning
that net proﬁts obtained from production (1−u)(p−w) are distributed to cover
the costs of job creation cuθ = cv:
cuθ = (1 − u)(p − w) (6.1)
The unemployment rate diﬀerential equation is:
˙ u = (1 − u)s(e) − uλ(θ) (6.2)
Note also that if workers were risk neutral the objective function of the social
planner would simplify to the expected value of output net of the eﬀort and job
creation costs uz + (1 − u)(p − C(e)) − cuθ, which is often used in theoretical
literature, see Pissarides (2000).
First order conditions of the stated optimization problem extend the result of
Hosios (1990), who shows that search externalities resulting from the dependence
of the transition probabilities λ(θ) and q(θ) on the market tightness are not likely
to be internalized by the Nash surplus equation, unless a particular value of the
bargaining power is assumed. A similar ﬁnding is documented in lemma 3 for the
case of risk averse workers and on-the-job moral hazard problem:
Lemma 3: Search equilibrium with risk averse workers, moral hazard and wage






– elasticity of the job ﬁlling rate q(θ) (6.3)
Proof: Appendix III.
276.2 Optimal unemployment insurance
This subsection considers the optimal unemployment insurance in search equilib-
rium with risk averse workers and moral hazard. As noted in Holmlund (1998):
”The economics of UI has ﬁrst and foremost been concerned with positive analysis
of the eﬀects of various UI policies. Much less attention has been devoted to the
normative issue: what is the optimal level of UI beneﬁts in an economy with
risk-averse workers?” (p.130).
Baily (1978) shows that risk aversion of workers implies optimality of the full
unemployment insurance w = z in the absence of informational asymmetries. To
see this consider the following optimization problem of the social planner, where
the unemployment insurance is now a choice variable and the moral hazard prob-








uυ(z) + (1 − u)υ(w)
i
dt
The planner’s resource constraint is then modiﬁed to include the new type of
expenses, namely unemployment beneﬁts uz:
cuθ + uz = (1 − u)(y − w) (6.4)
Solution to this optimization problem is summarized in proposition 4:
Proposition 4: The optimal unemployment insurance policy in search equilib-
rium with risk averse workers implies full unemployment insurance z = w, so that
the worker net rent R is equal to zero, the optimal wage equation is J = K + Z,












The optimal wage equation J = K + Z follows directly from the planner’s re-
source constraint and is expressed in terms of the steady state surplus values,
where K +Z are expected costs of maintaining one job and providing unemploy-
28ment insurance to one worker. These costs are ﬁnanced by ﬁrms proﬁts with a
corresponding surplus value J. The costs further are split between the ﬁrms and
the workers according to the proportion (1 − ηq)/ηq.
Provision of full unemployment insurance is not supported by the empirical evi-
dence, so that the basic search model has been extended in a number of relevant
directions. Baily (1978) shows that unemployed workers do not have incentives
to search if the full unemployment insurance if provided. This result persists even
if private savings of workers are introduced into the model. The explanation for
that is the fact that unemployment insurance is a sort of contingent saving, the
payment obtains only if the adverse event (job loss) is realized, unlike the pre-
cautionary saving which is independent of the event occurrence. Further Shavell
and Weiss (1979) in a general framework and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)
in a search and matching framework show that the optimal unemployment in-
surance should be decreasing over the unemployment spell in order to motivate
unemployed workers to search. In contrast to this, Chetty (2008) shows that
60% of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI beneﬁts is due to
a liquidity eﬀect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search. This
is due to the fact that increases in beneﬁts have much larger eﬀects on durations
for liquidity-constrained households.
In this paper a diﬀerent aspect of the eﬀect of unemployment insurance on the
decisions of labour market participants is analyzed. It is the on-the-job eﬀort level
workers exert which is dependent on the unemployment insurance. To see this
consider the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint (4.3). As shown in lemma
1 worker’s eﬀort is an increasing function of the net utility ﬂow υ(w) − υ(w0),
where w0 is the workers reservation wage obtained as w0 = υ−1(rU). The reser-
vation utility rU is an increasing function of unemployment insurance z, so that
worker’s eﬀort is negatively related to z. Intuitively a lower job rent R implies a
lower punishment for the worker in case of losing the job and therefore reduces
worker’s incentives to exert eﬀort. The problem of the social planner in this case








uυ(z) + (1 − u)(υ(w) − C(e))
i
dt, where e = e(w,w0)
29subject to the resource constraint (6.4) and the diﬀerential equation for unem-
ployment (6.2). Results are summarized in proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5: The optimal unemployment insurance policy in search equilib-
rium with risk averse workers and unobserved eﬀort implies partial unemploy-
ment insurance z < w, the optimal market tightness θ is obtained from equation
J = K + Z and further
(a.) the optimal replacement ratio z/w is implicitly given by:
υ′(w)
υ′(z)
= 1 − ηs (6.6)








Equation (6.6) shows, that full unemployment insurance is suboptimal if asym-
metric information concerning worker’s on-the-job eﬀort is taken into account. In
this setting the social planner is facing a trade-oﬀ between providing full unem-
ployment insurance and no eﬀort versus the absence of unemployment insurance
with maximum worker’s eﬀort. As a result the partial unemployment insurance is
optimal: z < w. This policy reduces expenses of the social planner for vacancies
and unemployment beneﬁts since workers exert positive eﬀort and jobs become
more stable. This result is supported in the theoretical literature, for example
Brown, Orszag and Snower (2006) in a diﬀerent framework with taxes ﬁnd that:
”Lower taxes (uncompensated costs of the employed) and lower transfers (un-
compensated beneﬁts of the unemployed) mean greater incentives for job search
and work eﬀort. The resulting rise in hiring rates and reduction in ﬁring rates
lead to a fall in unemployment. This in turn broadens the tax base and shrinks
the number of people requiring support, leading to further reductions in tax rates
and unemployment beneﬁt expenditures.” (p.19)
30In order to obtain an approximated expression for the optimal replacement ratio




′′(z)[w − z] (6.8)










Here ρ is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient of the unemployed, so that higher
risk aversion implies a higher optimal value of the replacement ratio z/w. At
the same time note that the elasticity variable ηs shows the sensitivity of the
separation rate with respect to the net ﬂow proﬁts p − w and therefore also
the sensitivity of the separation rate with respect to the ﬂow wage w. If the
dependence of the match separation rate on worker’s eﬀort is not recognized,
then ηs = 0 and so the social planner will optimally set z = w, which is the case
described in proposition 4. Otherwise a higher sensitivity of the separation rate
implies a higher marginal gain of providing eﬀort and therefore has a negative
eﬀect on the replacement ratio z/w.
7 Conclusions
This paper explores the question of unilateral asymmetric information and en-
dogenous separation rates in a general equilibrium model of labour market char-
acterized by search frictions and matching. The model proposed in the paper
combines key features of the eﬃciency wage theory with the search and matching
theory in a spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The main (unobserved)
variable in the model is worker’s eﬀort chosen in response to the contract wage.
The model predicts that a higher wage yields a higher job surplus to the worker
and consequently results in a higher level of worker’s eﬀort.
The key structural assumption of the model is that the distribution of produc-
tivity shocks is linked to the worker’s eﬀort level in such a way that higher eﬀort
raises expected duration of the productivity ﬂow. In this situation a higher value
of job surplus imposes a higher penalty for the worker in case of a separation,
which necessarily follows after a negative productivity shock. Therefore, in accor-
dance with the predictions of eﬃciency wage theory, workers employed at higher
31wages exert more eﬀort on-the-job. In this setting, diﬀerent from a shirking spec-
iﬁcation of eﬃciency wages, a higher eﬀort level translates into a lower separation
probability but does not prevent a separation. Additionally, this model structure
guarantees a decreasing relationship between workers’ performance and their dis-
missal probabilities, documented in the empirical literature (see Bishop (1990)
and Kwon (2005)).
Wages are determined endogenously in the model using the concept of Nash
bargaining generalized to include the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint.
Eﬃciency wages are then obtained as a special case for the zero bargaining power
parameter. In this setup ﬁrms are facing a trade-oﬀ between the net ﬂow proﬁt of
the job and its separation rate. Similar to the model by Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) the wage dispersion in the economy is a result of an exogenous produc-
tivity distribution which implicitly captures the ﬁrms and workers heterogeneity.
The model predicts that in a more productive match the ﬁrm will share the rent
with the worker inducing him to exert more eﬀort. Here the rent split resulting
from bargaining is ampliﬁed by the internal agency problems within the match.
This means that the moral hazard problem and contract incompleteness force
ﬁrms to share the rents even if the bargaining power of workers is equal to zero.
Overall, the equilibrium is characterized by a positive correlation of wages and
productivity and a negative correlation of wages and job separation rates.
Internal incentive problems between workers and ﬁrms combined with a non-
degenerate productivity draw distribution create an equilibrium labour market
situation with heterogeneous job separation rates. The resulting heterogeneity
is such that the more productive jobs are also more stable in expectation. The
increasing job stability is interacted with an assumed declining productivity draw
distribution, which serves to highlight an increasing scarcity of the more produc-
tive jobs. An interaction of job scarcity and its stability is likely to produce the
hump-shaped density functions of stationary productivity and wage distributions.
This result is consistent with the reported properties of observed earnings and
productivity distributions.
One of the ﬁnal remarks concerns the relationship between the reservation produc-
tivity and the stationary unemployment rate. The model predicts that a higher
reservation productivity (which itself may result from a higher unemployment
32beneﬁt) aﬀects unemployment in a number of ways. First, due to a lower value
of the ﬂow utility workers reduce their working eﬀort, which results in a higher
probability of negative shocks for all jobs and a higher average separation rate in
the economy. Second, a higher reservation productivity in the economy translates
into a lower number of successful job matches; this implies a lower job-ﬁnding
rate and a lower average separation rate (survivorship bias). Nevertheless, due
to a mutual neutralization of the last two eﬀects, the model predicts that the
total eﬀect of a higher reservation productivity on the stationary unemployment
rate is unambiguously positive implying a higher stationary unemployment rate
in the equilibrium.
Finally, this paper considers the question of optimal unemployment insurance in
an economy with risk averse agents and on-the-job moral hazard. Partial unem-
ployment insurance is optimal in this economy where the social planner is facing a
trade-oﬀ between incentives provision and unemployment insurance. This paper
also shows that the optimal replacement ratio is increasing in the workers risk
aversion and decreasing in the elasticity of the separation rate.
8 Appendix
APPENDIX I: Proof of lemma 1.
Rewrite equation (4.3) using a deﬁnition ∆υ ≡ υ(w) − υ(w0) to obtain:
∆υ = C(e) −
C′(e)
s′(e)
(r + s(e)) (I-1)







(r + s(e)) > 0 if s
′′(e) > 0 (I-2)
Therefore if s′′(e) > 0 eﬀort is an increasing function of ∆υ.
APPENDIX II: Proof of lemma 2.




′′(e)˜ µs + C




s = ∂˜ µs/∂e. Then from equation II-1 it follows that the curvature of the
optimal eﬀort function e(∆υ), in particular the sign of the second derivative of
eﬀort e′′(∆υ) with respect to the net ﬂow utility ∆υ, is deﬁned by the sign of the











Under the assumption C′′′(e) ≥ 0 expression (II-2) is weakly negative if ˜ µ′′
s ≥ 0
and ˜ µ′
s ≥ 0. This means that conditions (A2) are suﬃcient for the eﬀort function
to be weakly concave in the net ﬂow utility: e′′(∆υ) ≤ 0.
APPENDIX III: Proof of lemma 3
The current value Hamiltonian for the social planner problem is:
H = uυ(z) + (1 − u)(υ(w) − C(e)) + γ[uλ(θ) − (1 − u)s(e)]
+ α((1 − u)(p − w) − cuθ) where e = e(w,w0)
where α is a Lagrange multiplier and γ is a costate variable corresponding to u.
The optimal social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂u
= −rγ ⇒ αJ + R = γ (III-1)
since
R =
υ(w) − υ(z) − C(e)
r + s(e) + λ(θ)
and J =
p − w + cθ
r + s(e) + λ(θ)
Maximizing H with respect to w and θ yields:
∂H
∂w
= 0 ⇒ υ
′(w) − α[1 + Js
′(e)e
′(w)] = 0 (III-2)
∂H
∂θ
= 0 ⇒ γλ
′(θ) = αc (III-3)




= 0 ⇒ γλ
′(θ) = αc (III-4)
34Expression Js′(e)e′(w) < 0 can be alternatively rewritten as −ηs. Then it follows
from equations (III-1)-(III-3) that the optimal social planner solution is charac-
terized by the following surplus splitting equation:









APPENDIX IV: Proof of proposition 4
The current value Hamiltonian for the social planner problem is:
H = uυ(z) + (1 − u)υ(w) + γ[uλ(θ) − (1 − u)s]
+ α((1 − u)(y − w) − cuθ − uz)
where α is a Lagrange multiplier and γ is a costate variable corresponding to u.
The optimal social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂u
= −rγ ⇒ α(K + Z) + R = γ (IV-1)
In the steady state the resource constraint of the social planner implies: J =
K +Z, then equation (IV-1) can be written as αJ +R = γ. Maximizing H with
respect to w, z and θ yields:
∂H
∂w
= 0 ⇒ υ
′(w) − α = 0 (IV-2)
∂H
∂z
= 0 ⇒ υ
′(z) − α = 0 (IV-3)
∂H
∂θ
= 0 ⇒ γλ
′(θ) = αc (IV-4)
From equations (IV-2)-(IV-3) it follows that w = z so that R = 0, while the
surplus splitting equation takes the following form:








35APPENDIX V: Proof of proposition 5
The current value Hamiltonian for the social planner problem is:
H = uυ(z) + (1 − u)(υ(w) − C(e)) + γ[uλ(θ) − (1 − u)s(e)]
+ α((1 − u)(y − w) − cuθ − uz), where e = e(w,w0)
where α is a Lagrange multiplier and γ is a costate variable corresponding to u.
The optimal social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂u
= −rγ ⇒ α(K + Z) + R = γ (V-1)
In the steady state the resource constraint of the social planner implies: J =
K +Z, then equation (IV-1) can be written as αJ +R = γ. Maximizing H with
respect to w, z and θ yields:
∂H
∂w












= 0 ⇒ γλ
′(θ) = αc (V-4)
Workers incentive compatibility constraint can be written as Rs′(e) = −C′(e),
then equations (V-2)-(V-3) imply
υ′(w)
υ′(z)
= 1 + Js
′(e)e
′(w) = 1 − ηs (V-5)
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